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Key Points: 
• The IMF staff’s 2013 proposal to reprofile (i.e., stretch out for a 
short period without haircutting principal or interest) the maturing 
debt of a country that has lost market access is a sensible policy in 
cases where the IMF is uncertain whether the country’s debt stock is 
sustainable. 
• The motivation for the policy is to avoid situations, such as occurred 
during the Eurozone debt crisis, in which Fund resources are used to 
bail-out commercial creditors in full. 
• But a debt reprofiling is a species of debt restructuring and as such is 
susceptible to holdout creditor behaviour. 
• By allowing a small portion of its loans to the debtor country to be 
used to neutralise some or all of the additional credit risk caused by 
the reprofiling, the IMF could minimise holdout creditors in these 
operations. 
• The authors propose a technique for minimizing the risk that certain 
creditors may elect to decline a reprofiling proposal, no matter how 
lenient its terms. 
 
As a term of art, “debt reprofiling” describes a transaction in which 
maturities of debt are extended for a prescribed period without attempting to reduce 
the principal of, or in some cases even the interest rate on, the extended debts.  The 
classic example of sovereign debt reprofiling is Uruguay (May 2003) when the 
maturity dates of 18 series of Republic of Uruguay bonds issued in the international 
markets were extended by a period of five years.  The principal and interest rate on 
those extended bonds remained untouched; only the maturity dates were affected by 
the reprofiling.  The net present value loss caused by the Uruguay extension was 
relatively mild.  It was estimated at the time to be about 19 percent. 
Reprofiling in IMF Packages 
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In April 2013, the staff of the International Monetary Fund released a 
paper captioned “Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent Developments and 
Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework” (the “Fund Paper”).1  
Among other things, the Fund Paper raised the question of whether the IMF, when it 
is asked to assist countries whose existing debt stock may prove to be unsustainable, 
should first require that the maturities of that country’s debt falling due within the 
period of the Fund’s adjustment program be stretched out so that Fund resources are 
not used to repay the holders of those claims at par.  The motivation for this proposal 
appeared to be a desire to avoid being put in a situation where the Fund either had to 
bail out existing lenders with claims maturing during the program period, or else 
force the debtor to commence a full-scale restructuring of its debt stock as a condition 
to receiving IMF financial assistance.  Reprofiling is the intermediate step; it locks in 
existing lenders for a short period (say, 2-4 years), thus giving the Fund and the 
debtor country time in which to assess the situation and formulate an appropriate 
response.2 
There was nothing novel about the Fund Paper’s suggestion of a 
tactical reprofiling of near-term maturities in these circumstances.  During the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, the principal amounts of 
commercial bank loans maturing during IMF program periods were repeatedly 
stretched out.  Fund resources were never used to repay the principal of commercial 
bank loans.   
The logic behind the Fund staff’s reprofiling proposal seems self-
evident:  new lenders coming into a distressed debt situation do not buy out existing 
creditors at par.  Ever.  Not if they are behaving in a commercially rational manner.  
The fact that the IMF has in recent years been prepared to take this commercially 
irrational step suggests that other motivations are at work.  In the Eurozone debt 
crisis, for example, the Fund allowed itself to be persuaded that a restructuring of any 
portion of the debt of Greece, Ireland or Portugal threatened to set off a chain reaction 
dragging down the whole of the Eurozone.  It therefore participated with the 
European Union in financing packages for those countries in which much of the 
money simply bled out to repay existing bondholders at par (the belated Greek debt 
restructuring of 2012 being the sole exception). 
Explicit in the Fund Paper is an acknowledgment that sovereigns often 
wait far too long before commencing a necessary debt restructuring.  Implicit in the 
Paper, however, is an acknowledgment that any geopolitically important country will 
always have powerful friends who may see it as in their interest to avoid a debt 
restructuring.  Sometimes the motivation is a desire to cushion undercapitalised 
financial institutions in neighbouring countries from the effects of a default (Europe 
2010-13).  Sometimes it is to avoid adding a debt crisis to a political or military crisis 
                                                
1  The IMF April 2013 Paper is available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf  
 
2  For additional detail on the IMF Proposal, see Douglas Baird et al., The Role of the IMF in Future 
Sovereign Debt Restructurings, USC Law School Working Paper (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360274  
3 
(Ukraine 2013-14).  Sometimes it is just a fear that permitting a debt restructuring in 
one country will focus the attention of investors on the financial fragility of 
sovereigns elsewhere in the region (Europe again). 
Criticisms 
Several criticisms have been lodged against the suggestion that the 
near-term maturities of a country with a potentially unsustainable debt stock should 
be reprofiled as part of a Fund program.3  
• Criticism -- requiring a reprofiling of near-term maturities 
would spook investors and cause them to exit sooner and 
in greater numbers than they otherwise would. 
• Response --  
Investors will know about the country’s financial distress 
long before the finance minister visits Washington, D.C.  
Lenders who perceive an unbalanced risk/reward will flee 
because they have lost confidence in the credit.  Any 
investor so minded who stays put simply because he 
believes the official sector will pay him out in full if the 
credit risk materialises is not an investor the official 
sector should wish to encourage.  This behaviour 
embodies creditor moral hazard. 
Also, the specter of “fleeing creditors” means in practice 
a deepening discount in secondary market sales of the 
sovereign’s paper.  That process affects the sovereign 
only to the extent that it raises the cost of any new 
borrowing undertaken, as they say, in the shadow of the 
sovereign’s insolvency.  Higher borrowing costs may 
indeed force a sovereign to seek IMF assistance earlier 
than it otherwise might have done, but in most situations 
this will be altogether salutary.  Desperate, ruinously 
expensive Hail Mary financings undertaken in an attempt 
to defer difficult political decisions for a few more 
months or a few more weeks are almost always 
regrettable and eventually regretted. 
                                                
3  See Gabriel Stern & Charles Blitzer, The IMF Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, FT 
Alphaville, April 4, 2014, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/04/04/1819992/guest-post-the-imf-approach-
to-sovereign-debt-restructuring/ ; Douglas Rediker & Angel Ubide, The IMF is Courting New Risks 
With a Change in Policy on Debt Restructuring, PIIE Blog, January 28, 2014, 
http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4220  
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• Criticism -- The knowledge that an IMF program might 
require a reprofiling of near-term maturities will deter 
sovereigns from seeking a Fund program. 
• Response --  
This is debtor moral hazard.  The implication of this 
criticism is that sovereigns should be affirmatively 
encouraged in the belief that the official sector (and its 
taxpayer funders) will always indemnify them for their 
imprudent debt management policies as a means of 
attracting them to the front door of the IMF building. 
• Criticism -- a reprofiling will trigger the credit default 
swaps written on the sovereign’s paper. 
• Response --  
True, but so what?  CDS are a species of insurance policy 
entered into by third parties (naked sovereign CDS have 
been banned in the European Union).  A CDS “credit 
event” does not increase or decrease the size of the 
sovereign’s debt stock. 
• Criticism -- some countries (such as Brazil in 2002, 
Turkey in 2000 and Ireland in 2011) have received IMF 
assistance and recovered market access without either a 
reprofiling of near-term maturities or a full-scale debt 
restructuring. 
• Response --  
True but missing the point.  The Fund’s reprofiling policy 
would be triggered only in cases where the Fund is in 
doubt about the country’s ability to recover its footing.  
Naturally, in some cases that doubt will prove to be well 
founded, in others not so.  But the important question is 
who bears the risk of this uncertainty?  The Fund (by 
paying out existing creditors at par), or the lenders (by 
agreeing to defer near-term maturities for short periods)?  
If the Fund takes the risk and gets it wrong, it increases 
the likelihood that its own exposure -- some of which will 
have displaced existing creditors -- will need to be 
restructured or may not be repaid.  If the existing lenders 
assume the risk by deferring near-term maturities and the 
country recovers quickly, very little harm has been done.  
If the country does not recover and needs a more durable 
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debt restructuring, the existing lenders are no worse off 
than they would have been had the country fully 
restructured at the outset. 
• Criticism -- a policy of “when in doubt, reprofile” erodes 
the Fund’s flexibility to address situations on a case-by-
case basis. 
• Response --  
The flexibility resides in the “when in doubt” part of the 
equation.  The sole objective of the policy is to safeguard 
Fund resources.  If the Fund concludes that proceeding 
without a reprofiling would not materially increase the 
risk to the Fund as a new lender (because, for example, 
near term maturities of commercial debt are trivial), it 
need not ask for a reprofiling. 
Most criticisms of the reprofiling policy are specious, but there is one 
legitimate concern related to this policy.  A reprofiling is a type of debt restructuring, 
just the mildest type.  As such, it is inevitably susceptible to holdout creditor 
behaviour.  When the IMF tells a client country that Fund assistance will be 
conditioned on the debtor reprofiling its near-term maturities, the Fund is implicitly 
telling the country to restructure those debts and take the risk of hostile creditor legal 
action if some lenders cannot be brought along.  This unsettling prospect may indeed 
result in the country deferring the decision to seek Fund assistance longer than it 
should. 
Most sovereign bonds governed by the laws of New York or England 
now incorporate collective action clauses.  CACs permit a supermajority of holders 
(typically 75%) to agree to a debt restructuring with the consequence that any 
dissenting minority holders will be bound by the restructured terms.  The difficulty 
will therefore lie in securing the consent of holders of 75% of each series of bonds 
affected by the reprofiling, not an easy task if those holders believe that official sector 
monies will be used to pay them out in full and on time should they decline the 
invitation to reprofile their claims.  As things now stand, the inducement for creditors 
to vote in favour of a reprofiling is wholly negative -- the threat of an outright default 
possibly precipitating an ugly debt restructuring.  A certain number of lenders, post-
Europe and post-Ukraine (where official sector lenders have once again been bailing 
out commercial creditors), will call that bluff if the debtor country is geopolitically 
important. 
This places the Fund in a tough spot:  either lend the debtor all of the 
money needed to pay off maturing debts at par during the program period or 
potentially force the country into a messy, litigious debt restructuring. 
Incentives 
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There is an alternative.  A reprofiling inflicts two hardships on an 
investor.  First, it prolongs the investor’s credit exposure in the country for the period 
of the reprofiling (the “Extension Period”).  Second, it increases the amount of the 
lender’s credit exposure to the extent of the additional interest amounts accruing 
during the Extension Period. 
An example -- Ruritania, a country seeking IMF financial assistance, 
has a $100 million bond maturing in 6 months.  As part of its IMF program, Ruritania 
asks the holders of this bond to use the collective action clause in the bond to extend 
the maturity date of the bond for three years.  This requires the bondholders to 
increase their exposure to Ruritania by the amount of six additional semi-annual 
coupon payments.  (Let’s assume a 5% p.a. coupon, so that’s an additional $15 
million, or 15%, increase in bondholder exposure.) 
Nothing can be done about the first effect (prolonging exposure), 
although in comparison with a full-scale debt restructuring, a reprofiling locks in the 
exposure for only a short time.  The second effect (increasing the size of the exposure 
by the amount of interest accruing during the Extension Period), however, is 
remediable.  The IMF could permit a portion of its lending to the debtor country to be 
used to neutralise, in whole or in part, the additional credit exposure resulting from 
the extension. 
The simplest way to achieve this would be to use a portion of the 
borrowings under the Fund program as a prepayment of the coupons falling due 
during the Extension Period.  Those monies could be given to the trustee or fiscal 
agent for the issue with irrevocable instructions to apply the funds toward the 
additional interest accruals resulting from the extension.  The issuer would offer this 
arrangement to the holders as an inducement for them to vote in favour of the 
reprofiling. 
Other transaction structures are also possible but more complicated.  A 
special purpose vehicle could be established and funded with a portion of the IMF 
disbursements.  The SPV would then guarantee a pre-agreed number of coupons 
falling due under the reprofiled bonds.  Alternatively, the issuer could purchase a 
cash-collateralised letter of credit covering those coupons.  The objective, however, 
would be same -- to neutralise some or all of the additional credit exposure resulting 
from the reprofiling. 
The architects of this credit enhancement must prepare for the 
possibility that the sovereign debtor and the IMF will throw in the towel and accept 
the need for a full-scale debt restructuring even before the extension period has run its 
course.  What, in this circumstance, is to become of the money that has been set aside 
to secure coupon payments during the extension period?  In fairness, the creditors 
should not be deprived of the benefit of those funds; the money was, after all, part of 
the bargain offered to creditors in order to induce them to vote in favour of the initial 
reprofiling proposal.  But the arrangement could be structured so that, in the event of 
a premature termination of the extension period, any unused monies that had been set 
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aside to cover coupons during the extension period would be applied as a cash 
downpayment in the eventual restructuring of the affected obligations. 
Positions of the Actors 
As long as bondholders believe that a full IMF bailout will not be 
forthcoming, this arrangement should be attractive.  There is, of course, always the 
possibility that a deeper debt restructuring will be required when the Extension Period 
ends.  But balanced against that potential debt restructuring down the road is the dead 
certainty of a debt restructuring today if the debt is not reprofiled.  Faced with this 
alternative, most lenders will take their chances down the road. 
From the Fund’s standpoint, this is an efficient use of Fund resources 
in comparison with lending the debtor the full amount necessary to repay the 
maturing bonds.  In the example above, the Fund need disburse only $15 million to 
neutralise the additional credit risk caused by the reprofiling as opposed to the $100 
million that would have been required to allow the debtor to repay the bond in full.   
The IMF has crossed this policy bridge once before.  As part of the 
Brady Bond process in the 1990s, the Fund allowed a portion of its program 
disbursements to be used by the debtor countries to purchase collateral that was then 
pledged to secure Brady Bonds.  The Brady Bonds were exchanged for commercial 
bank loans as part of the restructuring.  In effect, official sector money was employed 
to induce commercial creditors to join a debt restructuring. 
For its part, a consensual reprofiling means that the debtor country 
borrows far less from the IMF than it otherwise would ($15 million versus $100 
million in the Ruritania example above).  That said, use of the collective action 
clauses in the sovereign’s bonds to approve a reprofiling would trigger credit default 
swaps and probably result in a temporary ratings downgrade.  The whole point of the 
reprofiling exercise, however, is to obviate the need for the country to refinance 
maturing debts in the near term so these events should have limited repercussions. 
By the very act of publishing the Fund Paper and starting this debate, 
the IMF has arguably achieved its most important objective -- disabusing investors of 
the assumption that sovereign lending has become risk free.  One unfortunate legacy 
of the Eurozone debt crisis and more recently the Ukraine bailout is the widespread 
perception that the official sector fears, and will not tolerate, sovereign debt 
restructurings, at least in countries that can be argued to pose some danger of 
becoming contagious or destabilising.  Puncturing the assumption that an implicit 
official sector guarantee has quietly been wrapped around the commercial debt of all 
countries meeting this criterion should be a high priority for the institutions who 
would otherwise be expected to make good on that guarantee. 
 
* * * * 
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